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12	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA			
13	COUNTYON	FALAMEDA		
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15	HARRENS LAB INC., a California corporation, and MING LI, an individual	Case No. RG21089893		
16	* Control ** Control *	OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE		
17	Petitioners,	APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY STAY ORDER AND		
18	v.	ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY		
19	BUREAU OF CANNABIS CONTROL	PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE		
20	(BCC); TAMARA COLSON, in her official capacity as Acting Chief of the Bureau of	[Filed Concurrently with Declarations of		
21	Cannabis Control; and DOES 1-10,	Travis White and Juan Ordaz in Support of Opposition Ex Parte Application for		
22	Respondents.	Temporary Stay Order and Order to Show Cause Why Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue		
23		•		
24		Date: March 4, 2021 Time: 3:30 p.m.		
25		Dept: 17 Judge: Hon. Frank Roesch		
26		Trial Date: To Be Set Action Filed: February 25, 2021		
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

2						Page
3	I.	Introd	Introduction			
4	II.					9
		A.	Legalization and Licensing			
5		В.	Legislative Enactment			
6		C.	Background Regarding the Revocation of Petitioners' Provisional License			
7	III.	Argun	nent			
8		A.	Petitio	ners Ai	re Seek	ting to Change, Not Preserve the "Status Quo" 14
9		B.	Petitio Execu	ners Al	so See the La	k to Prevent (or Reverse) a Public Entity's w for the Public Benefit
10		C.				hat a Preliminary Injunction to Reverse
11			Execution of a Public Statute by Officers of the Law is Appropriate Here, then Petitioners Still Cannot Meet the Preliminary Injunction Standard			
12			1.			annot Establish Greater Injury
13				a.	Petiti	oners' Allege Only Unsupported Pecuniary
14				b.		Public Interest Outweighs Any Pecuniary Injury
15						titioners
16			2.			Have Not Shown A Probability of Prevailing s
17				a.	Petiti Comp	oners Fail to Identify any Ministerial Duty to pel
18				b.	Legis	lative Enactments Are Presumed Valid
19				c.	Legal	oners' Due Process Claims Fail Because No lly Cognizable Property Right or Liberty
20					Intere Facts	est of the Petitioner is Implicated Under the of this Case
· 21					(1)	Petitioners Have No Protected Property Interest or Due Process Right Under the
22						Federal Constitution
23					(2)	Petitioners Have No Protected Right or Property Interest in Their Provisional
24					-	License Under State Law
25				d.	Have	If Petitioners Had a Protected Interest, They Received Adequate Process
26	IV.					
27	V.	Concl	usion			
28						2

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2	Page
3	CASES
5	ABBA Rubber Co. v. Seaquist (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 127
6 7	Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 39217
8	Alliance for a Better Downtown Millbrae v. Wade (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 12319
10	Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564
11	Borge v. County of Mendocino (2020) (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2020) 2020 WL 734268221
13	Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 988
15	Cape Concord Homeowners Assn. v. City of Escondido (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 18019
16 17	Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152
18	Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 44715
20	Davenport v. Blue Cross of Cal. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435
21	Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 545 U.S. 1
23	Gordon v. Horsley (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 33619
24 25	Kent v. Cty. of Yolo 411 F.Supp.3d 1118 (E.D. Cal. 2019)21
26 27	Lull v. County of Placer 2018 WL 4335572 (E.D. Cal. September 11, 2018)21
28	2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) 2 Page 3 O'Connell v. Superior Court 4 Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance 5 6 Orange Unified School Dist. v. Rancho Santiago Community College Dist. 7 8 People v. Lippert (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 30420 9 Pike v. Bruce Church Inc. 10 11 Raley v. Williams No. 2:14-cv-2652-JAM-CMK, 2018 WL 4027020 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2018)......21 12 Robbins v. Superior Court 13 14 Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation – Sand Diego Section 15 (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 104823 16 San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board v. Handlery Hotel Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 51724 17 Schmidt v. County of Nevada 18 19 Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles 20 21 Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. 22 Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn. v. Fulotti 23 24 Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City and County of San Francisco (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 814......19 25 26 Torres v. County of Calaveras 2018 WL 1763245 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2018)......22 27 28

1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) 2 Page 3 STATUTES 4 Business and Professions Code 5 6 7 § 26050.2 passim 8 9 10 11 12 § 26058......11, 26 13 Californa Code of Regulataions, Title 16 14 15 16 17 § 5701......10 18 § 5705......12, 13 19 § 5707......12, 13 20 § 5709......12, 13 § 5714......10 21 Civil Code of Procedures 22 23 § 529.......27 24 § 1085.......19 25 26 Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act9 27 28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS California Constitution, Article 1 United States Constitution **COURT RULES** California Rules of Court Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Respondents Bureau of Cannabis Control and Tamara Colson, in her official capacity as Acting Chief of the Bureau of Cannabis Control ("Bureau") (collectively, "Respondents"), submit the following memorandum of points and authorities in opposition ("Opposition") to Harrens Lab Inc. ("Harrens") and Ming Li's ("Li") (collectively, "Petitioners") Ex Parte Application for Temporary Stay Order and Order to Show Cause Why Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue. Respondents pursuant to California Rules of Court Rule 3.1113 subdivision (e), request permission to file this Opposition which exceeds 15 pages in length, as the excess pages are used to address the issues presented in Petitioners' 31 page Ex Parte Application.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioners challenge the Bureau's revocation of its Provisional Cannabis – Testing
Laboratory License ("Provisional License") for a cannabis testing laboratory, as set forth in the
Bureau's February 4, 2021, Notice of Revocation of License ("Notice"). Petitioners filed an
Unverified Petition for Writ of Mandate contending that Petitioners possess a constitutionally
protected property right in their Provisional License issued by the Bureau, and that the Bureau's
revocation of the Provisional License without notice, a hearing, or an appeal did not afford
Petitioners due process of law even though the Business and Professions Code expressly states
that provisional licenses, which are issued without investigation, confer no right to hearing or
appeal. (Ex Parte Application, page, 3, lines 6-17; page 8, lines 6-10; and page 8, lines 20-24.)
Separately, Petitioners filed this Ex Parte Application requesting a preliminary injunction
preventing the Bureau from enforcing its already-completed revocation action, and directing the
Bureau to "reinstate, and recognize the ongoing validity of the at-issue license," until the
Unverified Petition for Writ of Mandate is resolved. (Ex Parte Application, page 31, lines 16-23.)
This preliminary injunction should be denied.

Petitioners bear an especially heavy burden in seeking to reinstate their provisional license through a preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and Petitioners seek an especially disfavored type of preliminary injunction. Although Petitioners assert that they are merely seeking a prohibitory injunction, Petitioners' request is actually for a mandatory injunction that would change the status quo and require the Bureau to treat Petitioners

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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

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Legalization and Licensing

On January 1, 2018, Proposition 64, the Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act (AUMA), which had been passed by the California voters and established a "comprehensive system to legalize, control, and regulate the cultivation, processing, manufacture, distribution, testing, and sale of nonmedical marijuana, including marijuana products, for use by adults 21 years and older" went into effect. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 64, pp. 178-210.) The Bureau was authorized to "create, issues, deny, renew, discipline, suspend, or revoke licenses for microbusinesses, transportation, storage unrelated to manufacturing activities, distribution, testing, and sale of cannabis products." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26012, subd. (a)(1).)

In establishing a well-regulated cannabis industry, the licensing agencies' highest priority is "protection of the public." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26011.5.) To this end, all licensees must meet high standards and comply with the rules and regulations set forth for them. Testing laboratories perform the critical function of ensuring that cannabis goods are free from a lengthy list of contaminants and do not contain toxic levels of substances when ingested by consumers. Each batch of cannabis goods must be sampled and tested by a licensed testing laboratory prior to sale to consumers. Prior to licensure, each testing laboratory applicant must develop testing methods for each test performed and demonstrate their capability to perform regulatory compliance testing. They must follow requirements for sampling cannabis goods that include the size of the sample, how the sample is obtained, and how the sample is maintained, to ensure accurate testing results. Testing laboratories perform tests on cannabis goods to identify the presence and level of heavy metals, residual pesticides, residual solvents, microbial impurities, mycotoxins, and foreign material in cannabis goods. To ensure tests are properly performed, testing laboratories must maintain quality assurance and quality controls within the laboratory and ensure that laboratory employees are qualified to ensure compliance with the laws, rules, and regulations that govern them. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit 16, Additionally, , a testing laboratory is also responsible for ensuring that the chain of custody for samples of cannabis goods is maintained to protect the integrity of the testing process. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 5706.) This includes accurately

documenting the transport, handling, storage, and destruction of cannabis goods samples. The testing laboratory must be accredited to receive an annual license and is required to follow strict protocols imposed by the accrediting agency. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, §§ 5701 & 5714.)

Testing Laboratories have a very important function in ensuring public protection by scientifically determining that cannabis goods meet the safety standards in California. To do so, the testing laboratory must properly sample the batch, protect the sample from any potential tampering, perform the tests accurately, and produce accurate results. Any breakdown in this process allows the possibility that cannabis goods which do not meet California's safety standards are made available to the public for consumption. In some circumstances, this can lead to serious illness or even death.

B. Legislative Enactment

Initially, the Bureau was authorized to issue both temporary and annual licenses. (Former Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26050.1 added by Stats 2017 ch 27 § 32 and repealed January 1, 2019; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26050, subd. (c).) The temporary license was issued for a four-month duration, with opportunities for 90-day extensions, through December 31, 2018. (Former Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26050.1 added by Stats 2017 ch 27 § 32 and repealed January 1, 2019; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 5001.) The temporary license holder was required to comply with all laws, rules, and regulations, governing commercial cannabis activity. (*Ibid.*) The agency decision to deny or revoke a temporary license did not entitle the applicant or temporary license holder to a hearing. (*Ibid.*)

In 2018, prior to the statutory expiration of temporary licenses, Business and Professions Code section 26050.2, was enacted and gave the Bureau discretion to "issue a provisional license to an applicant if the applicant has submitted a completed license application to the licensing authority...." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26050.2, subd. (a) added by Stats. 2018 ch. 857, § 1 (Sen. Bill No. 1459.)¹ Provisional licensees are not required to complete all the requirements for an annual license. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 26050.2, subds. (a)(1) & (2).) This allows a commercial

¹ All statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code, unless otherwise indicated.

cannabis business to complete the requirements for the annual license while still operating its business. At the same time, and similar to the temporary license, the Legislature expressly stated an applicant or provisional license holder is *not* entitled to a hearing or an appeal if the agency decides to deny or revoke a provisional license:

(h) Refusal by the licensing authority to issue a license pursuant to this section or revocation or suspension by the licensing authority of a license issued pursuant to this section shall not entitle the applicant or licensee to a hearing or an appeal of the decision. Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 480) of Division 1.5 and Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 26040) of this division and Sections 26031 and 26058 shall not apply to licenses issued pursuant to this section.

(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26050.2, subd. (h).)

The enactment of section 26050.2, subdivision (h), served the policy goal of providing commercial cannabis businesses the opportunity to conduct a legal business, while aiding in the development of a comprehensive statewide regulated marketplace. Because provisional licenses can be issued based only on the submittal of an annual license application and a showing that other licensing requirements are being pursued, there is a need to be able to immediately stop the operation of such a business if it is not complying with state law requirements. Additionally, the Bureau is not required to issue a provisional license, nor is the applicant required to accept a provisional license if they do not want to accept the terms applicable to said license. An applicant, who is concerned with the ability of the provisional license to be revoked without a hearing, may choose to wait until a decision is made on their annual license application.

C. Background Regarding the Revocation of Petitioners' Provisional License

In April 2020, the Bureau received the first of several complaints against Harrens, a commercial cannabis testing laboratory provisional license holder and annual license applicant², related to its commercial cannabis testing laboratory operations. The complaints made similar

² A provisional license may only be issued to an applicant for an annual license. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26050.2, subd. (a).) If the annual license application is denied, the applicant has the right to a hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26058.) As of the date of this filing, there has been no final decision made regarding Petitioners' application for an annual license.

allegations of violations of the laws and regulations governing commercial cannabis operations. For example, several allegations were that Harrens was shipping cannabis samples using a third-party courier services and had improper testing protocols. (Declaration of Travis White, submitted herewith ("White Decl.") \P 2.)

The Bureau notified Petitioner Li of the alleged violations, and they had numerous communications in which the violations and laboratory operations were discussed and in which Petitioner Li had the opportunity to respond to these allegations. (White Decl. ¶ 2.) During these communications, however, Petitioner Li offered conflicting information. (White Decl. ¶ 3.)

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Bureau determined that Petitioners engaged in numerous ongoing violations, even after being advised of doing so, which evidenced a failure to comply with the provisions of the Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (MAUCRSA) and its implementing regulations, and provided causes for discipline under Business and Professions Code section 26030. (White Decl. ¶ 3.) Petitioners' violations included, but were not limited to, failing to take accurate representative samples of cannabis goods harvest batches (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, §§ 5705, 5707); failing to comply with laboratory transportation and chain of custody requirements by using third party courier services to ship cannabis goods samples (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, §§ 5706, 5709); failing to generate shipping manifests prior to transportation of cannabis goods (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 16, § 5049); transporting cannabis samples without affixing METRC identification labels to cannabis sample packaging (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 16, §5049); making premises modifications without seeking prior Bureau of Cannabis Control approval (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 5027); and, failing to run and maintain a video surveillance system (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 5044). (White Decl. ¶ 3.)

On February 4, 2021, the Bureau personally served Petitioners with a Notice of Revocation of Provisional License. (Ex Parte Application, Declaration of Ming Li, Exhibit A.) The notice states:

The license has been revoked for failure to comply with the provisions of the Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (MAUCRSA) and its implementing regulations, a cause for discipline under Business and Professions Code section 26030. Specifically, violations include, but are not limited to:

inability to take accurate representative samples of cannabis goods harvest batches; inability to satisfy laboratory transportation and chain of custody requirements by using third-party courier services to ship cannabis goods samples; failing to generate shipping manifests prior to transportation to cannabis goods; transporting cannabis samples without affixing METRC identification labels to cannabis sample packaging; making premises modifications without seeking prior Bureau approval; and failing to run and maintain a video surveillance system. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, §§ 5027, 5044, 5049, 5705, 5706, 5707, 5709.)

This revocation is effective immediately and you may no longer engage in any commercial cannabis activity under this license. Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 26050.2 subdivision (h), you are not entitled to a hearing or appeal of this decision.

(Ibid.)

At the time the Notice was delivered, which occurred approximately 10 months after the initial complaint was received and months after Petitioner Li was first questioned about possible violations, the Bureau observed and received reports from witnesses of ongoing and continuing violations of the laws, rules, and regulations, governing commercial cannabis testing laboratory licensees. (White Decl. ¶ 4.) A third-party courier service was still being used to transport cannabis samples (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, §§ 5706, 5709), and improper testing protocols were still being employed. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, §§ 5705, 5707). Additional violations included, but were not limited to, cannabis goods stored in an area not part of the testing laboratory licensed premises approved and regulated by the Bureau (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26055; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 5033, subd. (c)); cannabis waste not being properly discarded (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 5054); and, cannabis samples not properly labeled (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 5049).

Subsequently, on February 5, 2021, Harrens acknowledged understanding the reasons for the revocation of its testing laboratory provisional license. (Declaration of Juan Ordaz, submitted herewith ("Ordaz Decl.") ¶ 3.)

In short, the Bureau is charged with public protection, which is the "highest priority" for the Bureau "in exercising licensing, regulatory, and disciplinary functions." (Bus. & Prof. Code, §

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26011.5.) Petitioners were advised of the violations in their testing laboratory operations, understood the violations, yet continued to engage in those acts right up until the time the Bureau arrived to revoke their Provisional License. Moreover, Li was not truthful with the Bureau about their operations during the investigation. There is no evidence to suggest that Harrens can be trusted to properly perform testing on cannabis goods and accurately report those results. As testing laboratories are the gatekeepers for ensuring cannabis goods available to the public at licensed retailers meet California safety standards, the Bureau acted within its authority to ensure public protection by revoking Petitioners' Provisional License.

III. ARGUMENT

A. Petitioners Are Seeking to Change, Not Preserve the "Status Quo"

Petitioners ask the Court to enjoin the Bureau from enforcing its already effective revocation of the Provisional License, and "to reinstate, and recognize the ongoing validity of the at-issue license." (Ex Parte Application, page 31.) Although Petitioners repeatedly assert that they are seeking a prohibitory injunction that seeks to preserve the status quo (Ex Parte Application, pages 10, 13, 28), they actually seek a mandatory injunction that would require the Bureau to treat Petitioners as though they maintained an active and valid license pending trial. (Ex Parte Application, page 31.) The requested injunction would change the status quo and require the Bureau to affirmatively treat Petitioners in a way that is inconsistent with their current revoked, unlicensed, status. "[T]he general rule is that an injunction is prohibitory if it requires a person to refrain from a particular act and mandatory if it compels performance of an affirmative act that changes the position of the parties." (Davenport v. Blue Cross of Cal. (1997) 52 Cal. App. 4th 435, 446.) "The substance of the injunction, not the form, determines whether it is mandatory or prohibitory." (Id. at p. 447.) "[A] preliminary mandatory injunction is rarely granted, and is subject to stricter review on appeal. The granting of a mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established." (Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn. v. Fulotti (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1493.)

As shown below, this is not an "extreme" case that might warrant such a mandatory injunction—the Bureau's is expressly authorized in statute to act in the manner it did here, and

Petitioners have not "clearly established" a right to the injunction. Consequently, the rule against mandatory injunctions should prevail and Petitioners' request should be denied.

B. Petitioners Also Seek to Prevent (or Reverse) a Public Entity's Execution of the Law for the Public Benefit

The preliminary injunction sought by Petitioners is highly disfavored for another reason. A preliminary injunction generally should not be used to prevent "execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit"; nor "the exercise of a public or private office, in a lawful manner by the person in possession." (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (b)(4) & (6); Civ. Code, § 3423 subd. (d) & (f).) In *Cohen v. Board of Supervisors* (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 447, the Court of Appeal in upholding the trial court's denial of the preliminary injunction, stated:

Additionally, preliminary injunction is not an appropriate remedy '[t]o prevent the execution of a public statute, by officers of the law, for the public benefit' or '[t]o prevent the exercise of a public or private office, in a lawful manner, by the person in possession.' [Citations.] While these general strictures do not preclude the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief when the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is challenged, nevertheless, '... trial courts should be extremely cautious ... to enjoin law enforcement officials from enforcing an ordinance obviously approved and adopted by duly elected representatives of the people for the purpose of promoting and protecting public morality prior to a trial on the merits.' [Citations.] [emphasis added.]

(Id. at p. 453, 456.)

Here, the revocation of Petitioners' Provisional License was an "execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit." First, section 26050.2 is a "public statute" that permits provisional license revocation at the discretion of the Bureau at any time. Second, Harren's Provisional License was revoked "by officers of the law for the public benefit." A Bureau investigation found that Harrens had failed to comply with multiple provisions of the Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (MAUCRSA), and the implementing regulations. (White Decl. ¶ 3.) Specifically, as previously delineated above, Petitioners' violations were related to its important function to test cannabis goods intended for public consumption. (See, Opposition, page 6, lines 3-17.) Further, at the time the Notice of Revocation of the Provisional License was issued on February 4, 2021, the Bureau observed

ongoing and continuing violations of the laws, rules, and regulations governing commercial cannabis testing laboratory licensees. (White Decl. ¶ 3.) (See, Opposition, page 7, lines 7-16.) Hence, it is clear that Harrens did not intend to comply with the state law requirements to protect the public safety, as they continued with similar conduct, even after their interactions with the Bureau during the investigation. As such, the potential harm to the public continued until the time of revocation. There is no reason to believe that if Petitioners are allowed to resume operations pursuant to an injunction that they will comply with legal requirements this time. To protect consumers from the danger created by Harrens' continued disregard for public health, it is necessary for the revocation to remain in effect.

Thus, Petitioners must show not only that this is such an extreme cause that a prohibitory injunction is warranted; they also must overcome the even more extraordinary burden of showing that a prohibitory injunction preventing (or reversing) the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit is justified.

C. If the Court Finds That a Preliminary Injunction to Reverse Execution of a Public Statute by Officers of the Law is Appropriate Here, then Petitioners Still Cannot Meet the Preliminary Injunction Standard

Petitioners do not even begin to overcome the extraordinary burden that they must satisfy in seeking a mandatory injunction preventing the Bureau from enforcing measures designed to protect public health. Indeed, Petitioners do not even satisfy the ordinary requirements for a preliminary injunction. In determining whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate, Courts must determine both whether Petitioners are likely to suffer greater injury from denial of the injunction than Respondents are likely to suffer if it is granted (*Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 633.); and whether there is a reasonable probability that Petitioners will prevail on the merits. (*Robbins v. Superior Court* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206.) Petitioners' motion fails on both counts.

1. Petitioners Cannot Establish Greater Injury

"Public policy considerations come into play" when a preliminary injunction is sought against a public agency or officer. (*Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd.* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) In particular, courts must "bear in mind the

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 extent to which separation of powers principles may affect the propriety of injunctive relief against state officials. In that context, our Supreme Court has emphasized that 'principles of comity and separation of powers place significant restraints on courts' authority to order or ratify acts normally committed to the discretion of other branches or officials." (*O'Connell v. Superior Court* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1464.) As a consequence, even absent execution of a public statute for a public benefit, "[t]here is a general rule against enjoining public officers or agencies from performing their duties." (*Tahoe Keys, supra*, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1471; see also *Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392, 401 ["The codes, embodying a settled principle of equity jurisprudence, prohibit the granting of injunctive relief [t]o prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit"].) "[T]o support a request for such relief the plaintiff must make a *significant showing of irreparable injury*." (*Tahoe Keys, supra*, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1471, italics added.) Petitioners have not made that showing.

a. Petitioners' Allege Only Unsupported Pecuniary Injury

Petitioners assert several purely pecuniary injuries "(1) the loss of all cannabis business revenue which last year amounted to some \$4 million dollars, (2) the inability to maintain positive cash flow resulting in bankruptcy, (3) the unknowable damage to Applicant's business reputation, brand, and goodwill, (4) the incidental economic damage to the sudden and unexpected termination of 18 full-time employees, and (5) the loss of business momentum." (Ex Parte Application, page 28, lines 1-6.) The only support that they offer for these assertions, however, is a single conclusory paragraph with no evidence or explanation (Li Decl. ¶ 17), which is plainly insufficient.

b. The Public Interest Outweighs Any Pecuniary Injury to Petitioners

Even if Petitioners could prove the pecuniary injuries they assert, those injuries could not outweigh the importance of protecting consumer safety and preserving the authority and discretion of the public agency entrusted with that protection. The harm that may result if Petitioners are allowed to operate while not complying with the laws and regulations that exist to

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safeguard the public is significant. Testing laboratories perform the critical function of ensuring that cannabis goods are free from a lengthy list of contaminants and do not contain toxic levels of substances when ingested by consumers. In some instances, as we saw in the recent vaping crisis, untested cannabis goods can lead to serious injury or death. To meet the public safety goals of testing, it must be done properly and accurately. This means that the sample is from a specific batch of cannabis goods and that the sample has not been tampered with; thus, strict adherence to chain of custody protocols is necessary. Harrens was sending cannabis samples for testing through private, unlicensed third-party couriers, including those that deliver packages to your home, rather than maintaining custody of the sample and transporting it themselves. This practice allows for tampering with the cannabis goods sample such that it could be contaminated or could be substituted with a different sample from another batch. This also allows for diversion into the illegal market. Additionally, for testing to protect consumers from toxic or harmful cannabis goods, the person conducting the tests accurately report both the steps it the testing process and the results. Harrens has provided dishonest information to the licensing agency and has not demonstrated they can now be trusted to provide honest and accurate information regarding their testing activities. The public interest weighs heavily in favor of a licensing agency's ability to immediately stop the operation of a provisional license holder who intentionally deceives it and fails to comply with applicable laws and regulations that are designed to protect public health and safety.

Especially in light of Petitioners' failure to present any persuasive evidence of injury, the balance of harm does not favor Petitioners, as there is significant public interest in ensuring that a testing laboratory with a provisional license comply with applicable law, and in preserving the authority and discretion of the Bureau to ensure that compliance.

2. Petitioners' Have Not Shown A Probability of Prevailing On the Merits

Petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction also should be denied for the separate and independent reason that they have failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits.

a. Petitioners Fail to Identify any Ministerial Duty to Compel

As a threshold matter, Petitioners' motion fails because they have filed an Unverified Writ of Mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. Ordinary mandamus *may be used to compel the performance of a duty that is purely ministerial in nature (Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City and County of San Francisco* (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 814, 830) or to correct an abuse of discretion (*Gordon v. Horsley* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 336, 350-351). Three elements must be present for the issuance of a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085: 1) a beneficial interest or right of the petitioner; 2) a ministerial duty which may be compelled to protect the beneficial interest or right, and 3) a showing that there is no plain adequate remedy at law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085; *Orange Unified School Dist. v. Rancho Santiago Community College Dist.* (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 750, 765.) Petitioners cannot satisfy the second element: the presence a ministerial duty.

"A ministerial duty is one that is required to be performed in a prescribed manner under the mandate of legal authority without the exercise of discretion or judgment.' [Citation.]" (Cape Concord Homeowners Assn. v. City of Escondido (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 180, 189.) "A ministerial duty is an act that a public officer is obligated to perform in a prescribed manner required by law when a given state of facts exists." (Alliance for a Better Downtown Millbrae v. Wade (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 123, 129.) Here, there is no ministerial duty. Instead, the authority and discretion of the Bureau is clear: "It being a matter of statewide concern... the Bureau shall have the sole authority to create, issue, deny, renew, discipline, suspend, or revoke licenses for... transportation, storage... distribution, testing and sale of cannabis and cannabis products throughout the state." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26012, subd. (a)(1).) In exercising its discretion, "[t]he protection of the public shall be the highest propriety for all licensing authority in exercising licensing, regulatory, and disciplinary functions under this division." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26011.5.) With respect to a revocation of provisional licenses held by applicants who are operating without having yet completed the application process, "a licensing authority may, in its sole discretion, revoke or suspend a provisional license." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26050.2, subd.

(c).) Finally, "revocation or suspension by the licensing authority a license issued pursuant to this section shall not entitle the applicant or licensee to a hearing or an appeal of the decision." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26050.2.)

Thus, revocation of a provisional license is a discretionary act that, under the section 26050.2, does not give rise to a right to hearing, and there is no ministerial duty to provide a hearing to a provisionally licensed business whose annual license application is still under review. For this reason alone, the petition fails.

b. Legislative Enactments Are Presumed Valid

Even if a petition for writ of mandate were a proper vehicle for challenging the revocation of their provisional license, Petitioners' challenge would still fail because section 26050.2 is unambiguously antithetical to Petitioners' arguments, and while they claim that this statute is invalid under either or both the United States Constitution and/or the California Constitution, Courts apply "a strong presumption of constitutionality [to the] Legislature's acts." (*People v. Lippert* (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 304, 311 quoting *Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1253, 1256; see also, *Pike v. Bruce Church Inc.* (1970) 397 US 137, 142.) The bar for overcoming that presumption is exceptionally high: "The court cannot invalidate a statute enacted pursuant to the state's police power unless it has no reasonable relation to a legitimate purpose accomplished by the enactment." (*Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 988, 1024 (citing to *Sligh v. Kirkwood* (1915) 237 U.S. 52, 61).) As the following sections demonstrate, Petitioners cannot overcome this presumption.

c. Petitioners' Due Process Claims Fail Because No Legally Cognizable Property Right or Liberty Interest of the Petitioner is Implicated Under the Facts of this Case

Petitioners' claim, notwithstanding the unambiguous language of section 26050.2, that they have "a constitutionally protected property right" that cannot be revoked "without affording constitutionally mandated due process of law." (Ex Parte Application, page 10, lines 22-23). However, the law is clear that there is no *federally* protected right to engage in any commercial activity involving cannabis. Additionally, no provision of the California Constitution dictates that a property interest in a provisional license or any other entitlement accrues as a consequence of

detrimental reliance or because of a licensee's subjective, unilateral understanding of the nature of the right or privilege conferred by a statute. As such, no colorable argument can be made that Petitioners' have a right to a hearing prior to revocation of their Provisional License or that the revocation itself resulted from, or amounts to, a violation of any provision of either the United States or California Constitution.

(1) Petitioners Have No Protected Property Interest or Due Process Right Under the Federal Constitution

While California has legalized commercial cannabis activity, these activities remain illegal under federal law. (*Gonzales v. Raich* (2005) 545 U.S. 1.) Because cannabis, or "marijuana" as it is referred to in federal statutes, is classified "as [a] Schedule I drug . . . the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana became a criminal offense." (*Id.* at p. 14 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f), 841(a)(1), and 844(a)).) Despite state legalization, there is no federal constitutional right to engage in any commercial cannabis activity. (*See, Kent v. Cty. of Yolo*, 411 F.Supp.3d 1118, 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (citing *Cook v. City of Cal. City*, 2017 WL 1348951, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2017)); *see also, Raley v. Williams*, No. 2:14-cv-2652-JAM-CMK, 2018 WL 4027020, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2018).) Even where commercial cannabis activity is legal under state law, it is not recognized as a protected property interest under the U.S. Constitution. (*Kent, supra*, 411 F.Supp.3d at 1123.)

To the extent that Petitioners wish to argue that seizure of the samples by enforcement staff constitutes a violation of their constitutional rights under the Federal Constitution, they "face the insurmountable hurdle that federal law does not recognize any protectable liberty or property interest in the cultivation, ownership, or sale of marijuana." (*Borge v. County of Mendocino* (2020) (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2020) 2020 WL 7342682 at * 6 quoting *Citizens Against Corruption v. County of Kern*, 2019 WL 1979921, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2019) and citing *Brady v. Gebbie* (1998) 859 F.2d 1543, 1548.) Federal courts have repeatedly found that there is no cognizable property interest in cannabis and have repeatedly granted motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b)(6), based upon findings that no person can have a legally protected interest in contraband per se. (*Lull v. County of Placer*, 2018 WL 4335572, at *3 (E.D. Cal.

September 11, 2018); *Schmidt v. County of Nevada*, 2011 WL 2967786, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2011).)³ For these reasons the Court should disregard all arguments and authorities cited by Petitioners which contemplate any property interest or substantive or procedural due process right under the Federal Constitution.

Even if it were possible that there could be a federally protected interest in the operation of a commercial cannabis business, Petitioners fail to make the case that any violation could have occurred in this matter. Petitioners rely significantly on the *Board of Regents v. Roth* (1972) 408 U.S. 564, a case in which the Court ruled that the beneficial interest at the heart of the matter *was not* a property interest sufficient to require a hearing. The Court wrote "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person must have more than an abstract need or desire for it or a unilateral expectation of it, and he must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." (*Id.* at p. 577.)

Petitioners, like the appellant in the *Board of Regent* case, have never been given any reason to believe that they are entitled to a hearing. In a passage quoted by Petitioners, the Court wrote that property rights are "created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source," such as state law. (*Ibid.*) Petitioners then state that the "independent source" of their right to a hearing is Section 26050.2 (Ex Parte Application, page 16, lines 4-6), the very statute that expressly states that they are "not entitle[d]... to a hearing." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26050.2, subd. (h).) Petitioners in this matter cannot identify any statutory right to a hearing or identify any federally protected right that exists.

(2) Petitioners Have No Protected Right or Property Interest in Their Provisional License Under State Law

Petitioners also claim that their right to a hearing prior to revocation of their provisional cannabis license finds support under the due process clause of the California Constitution. (Cal Const. Art. 1 § 7.) They are mistaken. Section 26050.2 provides that provisional licenses may be issued to applicants whose annual license applications are under review. The purpose of this

³ Under "federal law, marijuana is contraband per se, which means no person can have a cognizable legal interest in it." (*Id.*) Thus, "courts in this district have dismissed 'marijuana as property' cases brought under the Fourteenth Amendment." (*Torres v. County of Calaveras*, 2018 WL 1763245, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2018).)

provision is to allow commercial cannabis businesses to begin operation or continue operating within the legal market to facilitate the growth of a lawful industry, and ensure access to safe, tested cannabis, and cannabis products. It is important to note that, pursuant to Section 26050.2(e), a provisional license is cancelled once a determination is made regarding the annual license application. If the annual license application is denied, there is no provision allowing the continued operation of the business after the cancellation of the provisional license until a hearing is held regarding the denial. These licenses are designed to be transitional and temporary in nature, and are subject to lesser protections than annual licenses. If the provisional license carried the same rights as an annual license, this would effectively change the annual license requirements; the only difference between the provisional and annual license would be that the applicant does not have to meet the annual license requirements to receive a provisional license, thus, there would be no need for both types of licenses.

Provisional licenses can, under the express terms of the statute which authorizes their issuance, be revoked without hearing or an opportunity to appeal. (Bus. & Prof Code, § 26050.2, subd. (h).) Thus, Petitioners have no statutory right to a hearing.

This is fatal to Petitioners' claims. To show that there has been a violation of substantive or procedural due process rights, Petitioners must, as a preliminary matter identify the property or liberty interest at issue and demonstrate that the right was arbitrarily denied or revoked in a manner that does not serve any legitimate state interest or that the identified interest warrants greater procedural protections than were afforded it, prior to or after its denial or revocation. (See *Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation – Sand Diego Section* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1071 (citing *People v. Ramirez* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 267); *Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach*, (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1184.) Even though Petitioners were on notice of the conditional nature of the privilege that was conferred upon them by the Bureau in accordance with section 26050.2, Petitioners argue that a property right in their license somehow accrues on vague estoppel grounds. The argument appears to be that Petitioners invested money in detrimental reliance. (Ex Parte Application, page 8, lines 18-19.) This reliance appears to be based upon their unilateral belief that their Provisional License would last for an interminable period

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regardless of whether or not Petitioners made any effort to comply with applicable law. This belief does not create any property right protected by due process.

A provisional license holder may operate until the provisional license expires, is revoked, or when the annual license application is granted or denied. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §26050.2 subds (d), (e), and (h).) In order to ascertain whether there has been a due process violation in this case, the Court would have to determine whether, as the Petitioners' claim, issuance of a provisional license creates a protected property interest. "In determining whether permits or licenses are property, the courts consider whether the permit or license is transferrable, the extent to which the government has the right to regulate the underlying activity or to revoke, suspend or modify the permit or license and whether there has been a legislative or regulatory expression that issuance of a permit does not create a property right." (*Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, supra*, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1031 citing *American Pelagic Fishing Co. LP v. US* (2004) 379 F.3d 1363.)

Each of these factors weight against Petitioners. Here, the commercial cannabis industry is highly regulated, licensees are subject to strict oversight, and the statute indicates that provisional licenses are subject to revocation without a hearing. In addition, Petitioners were on notice of the nature of the license and scope of their right that had been conferred by the Bureau and it is not reasonable to expect that a *provisional* license confers any permanent entitlement. Moreover, Petitioners were not required to accept a provisional license if the lack of hearing rights were of concern to them. Any subjective unilateral belief Petitioners had about the nature of their rights under a provisional license is not supported in statute and unreasonable. "[T]o be a protectable property interest, the interest must be more substantial than a mere unilateral expectation of continued rights or benefits." (*San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board v. Handlery Hotel Inc.* (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 517, 532 (citing *Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co.* 467 U.S. 986, 1005).) Neither unilateral expectations nor detrimental reliance determine the scope of the rights or privileges which attend a provisional license, especially in the face of the express disclaimer of any such rights in section 26050.2.

d. Even If Petitioners Had a Protected Interest, They Have Received Adequate Process

As shown above, Petitioners' procedural due process claims fails because there is no federally protected property or liberty interest, and under California law, the legislature has already defined the scope of the right to hold a provisional license and determined that no hearing shall be required prior to its revocation. Nonetheless, if the Court finds that a due process analysis is triggered under the facts alleged under this case then, "under the California Constitution, the extent to which procedural due process is available depends on weighing of private and governmental interests involved." (Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1999) 20 Cal.4th 371, 390 (quoting Rodriguez v. Department of Real Estate (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1297).) Here, again, the balance weighs heavily in favor of the governmental interest in protecting public health and safety and against any right to a hearing prior to revocation of a provisional cannabis license.

The Legislature enacted a statute allowing for the issuance of provisional licenses while annual licenses were being processed. In doing so, it defined the scope of Petitioners' beneficial interest in their provisional license. Petitioners assert that a provisional license is "identical to a slightly different named [annual] license." (Ex Parte Application. Page 22, lines 6-7.) That is wrong. The privilege to operate while one's license application is being processed is very different than the right conferred after full review of an application and issuance of an annual license. The State has adopted a two-tiered system that serves the policy goal of providing cannabis operators an avenue to engage in the legal market, while aiding in the development of a comprehensive state wide program. Because provisional licenses can be issued based merely on the submittal of an annual license application and a demonstration that compliance with local and state law is underway, and because Section 26050.2 warns that provisional licenses may be revoked without a hearing or appeal, the interest of provisional license holders in their licenses is far less substantial than the interest of annual license holders in their licenses. By contrast, the public interest in being able to revoke provisional licensees without holding a hearing is far more substantial because, in contrast to annual license holders, provisional license holders have never

made a showing that they are in compliance with state and local law, which in turn creates a need to be able to revoke provisional licenses once it is determined that they cannot or will not comply with those requirements. As such, due process does not require a hearing prior to revocation of a provisional license under section 26050.2.⁴

Petitioners' benefited financially from the privilege of holding a provisional license while their annual license application was pending. Petitioners' inability to perform the responsibilities that came with the privilege, even after being put on notice and being provided the opportunity to correct the violations by complying with legal requirements left the Bureau with no choice but to revoke the provisional license. Public protection mandated the Bureau do so. Moreover, Petitioners received more than adequate process. They were notified of the issues being reviewed by the Bureau, and they had the opportunity to provide relevant information in response to the Bureau's inquiries. In addition, because a provisional license holder is also an annual license applicant, they still have an application pending and are entitled to a full hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act if that application is denied. (Bus & Prof. Code, § 26058.) Due process does not require that they also receive a formal hearing prior to the revocation of the privilege to operate that they received prior to proving that they are able to do so in compliance with state and local requirements.

For the reasons given above, the Petitioners in this matter will be unable to demonstrate that a property or liberty interest has been revoked or is being denied in violation of their substantive due process rights or in violation of the applicable requirements of procedural due process.

⁴ Petitioners state they "are entitled to ordinary mandamus relief to compel Respondents to provide a fair and impartial hearing before an independent hearing officer (i) **before revocation** of their license authorizing them to operate a cannabis testing laboratory..." (Ex Parte Application, page 11, lines 16-19 [emphasis added].) However, a hearing **before revocation** would raise public safety issues of permitting a cannabis testing laboratory that has been found to be in violation of cannabis regulations by the Bureau to continue to operate while the hearing was pending. The public interest weighs heavily in favor of a licensing agency's ability to halt the operation of a business with a provisional license that has failed to comply with applicable regulations, as the period between the citation of the violations and the hearing would permit cannabis that was not tested in accordance with the required regulations, by a laboratory with a provisional license, to enter the lawful chain of commerce.-

IV. PETITIONERS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO POST A BOND

If the Court were to issue a preliminary injunction, it must require an undertaking or cash deposit in lieu of an undertaking. (Code. Civ. Proc., §§ 529, 995.710.) The bond should be sufficient to cover any injury to the public or damage to the Bureau caused by a wrongly issued injunction. (*Id.*, § 529.) The bond amount should take into account all reasonably foreseeable costs resulting from the injunction, including the costs of Respondents' defense in this action. (*ABBA Rubber Co. v. Seaquist* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1, 14-15.) The potential harm is potentially significant. While it is hard to predict all the potential adverse consequences of a preliminary injunction and ensuing damages, plainly a substantial bond, to secure the many millions of dollars at risk, is warranted here.

V. CONCLUSION

The Ex Parte Application for stay order and request for a preliminary injunction should be denied.

Dated: March 3, 2021

Respectfully Submitted,

SD2021800410

XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California HARINDER K. KAPUR Senior Assistant Attorney General

Patrick Boyne

PATRICK BOYNE
Deputy Attorney General
ETHAN A. TURNER
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
Bureau of Cannabis Control and
Tamara Colson, Acting Chief

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11	Bureau of Cannabis Control and Tamara Colson, Acting Chief			
12	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
13	COUNTY O	FALAMEDA		
14				
15 16	HARRENS LAB INC., a California corporation, and MING LI, an individual	Case No. RG21089893		
17 18	Petitioners,	DECLARATION OF TRAVIS WHITE IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR		
19	v. BUREAU OF CANNABIS CONTROL	TEMPORARY STAY ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION		
20	(BCC); TAMARA COLSON, in her official capacity as Acting Chief of the Bureau of	SHOULD NOT ISSUE		
21	Cannabis Control; and DOES 1-10,	[Filed Concurrently with Opposition to Ex Parte Application for Temporary Stay		
22	Respondents.	Order and Order to Show Cause Why Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue]		
23 24		Date: March 4, 2021		
25		Time: 3:30 p.m. Dept: 17 Judge: Hon. Frank Roesch		
26		Trial Date: None yet Action Filed: February 25, 2021		
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I, Travis White, declare:

- 1. I am a Special Investigator with the Bureau of Cannabis Control within the Department of Consumer Affairs, for the State of California. My duties include quality assurance and monitoring of commercial cannabis business license holders to ensure compliance with the laws, rules, and regulations governing licensed commercial cannabis businesses. I have personal knowledge of the information set forth herein below, all of which is true and correct of my own personal knowledge, and if called upon to testify, I could and would competently testify thereto.
- 2. Beginning in April, 2020, and continuing into 2021, the Department of Consumer Affairs, Bureau of Cannabis Control received complaints against Harrens Lab Inc., located at 3507 Breakwater Avenue, Hayward, CA, a testing laboratory holding a provisional license through the Bureau of Cannabis Control.
- 3. On April 25, 2020, following receipt of the first complaint, I was assigned to investigate allegations of misconduct by Harren Labs Inc., which included the following: shipping cannabis samples using a third-party courier services and improper testing protocols. During the course of several months, I exchanged emails and communications with Ming Li, Chief Operating Officer, regarding Harrens Lab Inc.'s operations and practices, to determine its compliance with testing laboratory laws, rules, and regulations. Based on these communications, Ming Li was asked about instances of non-compliance with testing laboratory laws, rules and regulations by Harrens Lab Inc. and its staff. When discussing certain violations, including improperly sampling cannabis products for regulatory testing, Ming Li provided conflicting responses. As an example, when asked about sending cannabis and cannabis products through third party couriers and any knowledge of this, Ming Li initially denied that cannabis and cannabis products were being sent through third party couriers and any knowledge of it. Subsequently, he indicated it had happened only once, then later he admitted that it had been going on for part of 2019 and all of 2020, and also confirmed that he himself had knowledge of, participated in, and instructed his employee to, receive and send cannabis samples from a thirdparty courier.

4. At the conclusion of the investigation, I submitted the findings for review and a				
decision regarding the license. The findings were that Harrens Lab Inc. had failed to comply with				
the provisions of the Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (MAUCRSA)				
and its implementing regulations, causes for discipline under Business and Professions Code				
section 26030. Specifically, violations included, but were not limited to, violations of California				
Code of Regulations, Tile 16, sections 5027, 5044, 5049, 5705, 5706, 5707, and 5709, for:				

- An inability to take accurate representative samples of cannabis goods harvest batches;
- An inability to satisfy laboratory transportation and chain of custody requirements by using third-party courier services to ship cannabis goods samples;
- Failing to generate shipping manifests prior to transportation to cannabis goods;
- Transporting cannabis samples without affixing METRC identification labels to cannabis sample packaging;
- Making premises modifications without seeking prior Bureau of Cannabis Control approval; and
- Failing to run and maintain a video surveillance system.
- 5. On February 4, 2021, I along with other Bureau of Cannabis Control staff, including Special Investigators and Detectives with the Bureau of Cannabis Control's Cannabis Enforcement Unit, went to Harrens Lab Inc. to serve a Notice of Revocation of License. While serving the revocation notice, ongoing and continuing violations of the laws, rules, and regulations governing commercial cannabis testing laboratory licensees were either observed or described by witnesses present. Specifically, these violations included, but were not limited to,
 - · Cannabis goods stored in an unlicensed premises:
 - · Cannabis waste not being properly discarded;
 - · Cannabis samples not properly labeled;
 - A third-party courier service was still being used to transport cannabis samples;
 and,
 - Improper testing protocols.

1	I declare under penalty of perjur	y under the laws of the State of Ca	alifornia, that the
2	foregoing is true and correct.		
3	Executed on Much /	, 2021, at Rencho Cordover	, California.
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11	Bureau of Cannabis Control and Tamara Colson, Acting Chief	
12	SUPERIOR COURT OF TH	E STATE OF CALIFORNIA
13	COUNTY OF	FALAMEDA
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15	HADDENC LADING - California	C N- DC21080802
16	HARRENS LAB INC., a California corporation, and MING LI, an individual	Case No. RG21089893
17	Petitioners,	DECLARATION OF JUAN ORDAZ IN SUUPORT OF OPPOSITION TO EX
18	v.	PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY STAY ORDER AND
19	DUDE ALI OF CANNADIS CONTROL	ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
20	BUREAU OF CANNABIS CONTROL (BCC); TAMARA COLSON, in her official	SHOULD NOT ISSUE
21	capacity as Acting Chief of the Bureau of Cannabis Control; and DOES 1-10,	[Filed Concurrently with Opposition to Ex
22	Respondents.	Parte Application for Temporary Stay Order and Order to Show Cause Why
23		Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue]
24		Date: March 4, 2021 Time: 3:30 p.m.
25		Dept: 17 Judge: Hon. Frank Roesch
26		Trial Date: None yet Action Filed: February 25, 2021
27		
28		

I, Juan Ordaz, declare:

- 1. I am a Supervising Special Investigator II with the Bureau of Cannabis Control within the Department of Consumer Affairs, for the State of California. My duties include overseeing investigations of complaints regarding commercial cannabis business license holders and alleged non-compliance with the laws, rules, and regulations governing licensed commercial cannabis businesses. I have personal knowledge of the information set forth herein below, all of which is true and correct of my own personal knowledge, and if called upon to testify, I could and would competently testify thereto.
- 2. On February 4, 2021, I accompanied other Bureau of Cannabis Control staff, including Special Investigators and Detectives with the Cannabis Enforcement Unit, to Harrens Lab Inc., to serve a Notice of Revocation of License. At that time, I met with Ming Li and provided my business card to him, at his request.
- 3. On February 5, 2021, I received an email from Daniel R. Hess, Quality Assurance Manager with Harrens Lab Inc., stating that Harrens Lab Inc., understood why its Testing Lab Provisional License was revoked. Attached hereto as Exhibit ___A_ is a true and correct copy of the email from Daniel R. Hess dated February 5, 2021.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on MARCH / , 2021, at RANCHO CORDOVA, California.

JUAN ORDAZ

SD2021800410 Superior Court Pleading (2 Party) no cover.docx

EXHIBIT A

From: daniel@harrenslab.com <daniel@harrenslab.com>

Sent: Friday, February 5, 2021 3:51 PMTo: BCC Labs@DCA < <u>BCCLabs@dca.ca.gov</u>>Cc: Ordaz, Juan@DCA < <u>Juan.Ordaz@dca.ca.gov</u>>

Subject: Request for Clarification

[EXTERNAL]: daniel@harrenslab.com

CAUTION: THIS EMAIL ORIGINATED OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS!

DO NOT: click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe.

NEVER: provide credentials on websites via a clicked link in an Email.

Greetings Bureau,

I am writing you today in order to seek clarification on whether or not we may test schedule I control substance (including Marijuana) products under our DEA Registration Number

RH0490805 for quality assurance purposes. We understand why our provisional license, license number C8-0000021-LIC, was revoked and intend to fully cooperate with the Bureau concerning all matters of business.

I have attached a copy of our DEA Registration.

Regards,

Daniel R. Hess, <u>M.Sc.</u> Quality Assurance Manager Harrens Lab Inc. 3507 Breakwater Ave. Hayward, CA 94545

O: 510-319-3636 C: 573-823-0971

http://www.HarrensLab.com

ISO/IEC 17025 Accredited by A2LA Certificate Number: 4074.01 & 4074.02

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DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL

Case Name:

Harrens Lab Inc v. Bureau of Cannabis Control et al.

No.:

RG21089893

I declare:

I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter.

On March 3, 2021, I served the attached:

OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY STAY ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE;

DECLARATION OF TRAVIS WHITE IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY STAY ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE; AND

DECLARATION OF JUAN ORDAZ IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY STAY ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE

by transmitting a true copy via electronic mail, addressed as follows:

Drew Sanchez Anthony Law Group 3542 Fruitvale Avenue, #224 Oakland, CA 94602

E-mail Address:

drew.sanchez@anthonylaw.group

Victoria Vertner Anthony Law Group 3542 Fruitvale Avenue, #224 Oakland, CA 94602

E-mail Address:

victoria@anthonylaw.group

Zoe Schreiber Anthony Law Group 3542 Fruitvale Avenue, #224 Oakland, CA 94602

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hannah@anthonylaw.group

James M. Anthony Anthony Law Group 3542 Fruitvale Avenue, #224 Oakland, CA 94602 E-mail Address:

james@anthonylaw.group

Counsel for Petitioners

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States of America the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on March 3, 2021, at San Diego, California.

Elsa Olguin

Declarant

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